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The future of a country is closely tied to its economy, and entrepreneurs have a 
direct impact on that future. Many Kenyans are underserved by formal financial 
institutions, despite Kenya’s relatively robust banking structure when compared to those 
of other African nations. Kenyan entrepreneurs can, however, turn to alternative finance 
options like microfinance institutions (MFIs) and rotating savings and credit associations 
(ROSCAs). In this paper, the success of these two alternative finance institution types is 
judged in terms of their respective abilities to create economic growth and improve 
individual welfare. In general, while MFIs targeted toward entrepreneurs, like the Kenya 
Women’s Finance Trust (KWFT), present a more direct causal link to business growth, 
ROSCAs are more prevalent and are in a better position to increase individual welfare. In 
the future, MFIs should adapt their lending practices to leverage some of the cultural 
aspects of group-centered lending that are firmly embedded in ROSCAs. By doing so, 
MFIs will lower their transaction costs and ensure they are better able to operate in the 
future. Similarly, as new financial technologies like mobile phone-based banking emerge, 
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For Kenyans who wish to start or expand businesses, traditional financial options 
are limited. Banks, which are ubiquitous in the West, are not as common in Africa. 
Though Kenya has one of the most robust banking systems in Africa, many Kenyan 
entrepreneurs are still unable to access formal financial services. This problem is 
especially prevalent among women.1 For those who seek financial services and find that 
banks cannot or will not meet their needs, other informal financial options have gained 
popularity. In this environment, microfinance institutions (MFIs) and rotating savings and 
credit associations (ROSCAs) have served entrepreneurs. Contrasting the positive 
publicity that these alternative finance options have received in recent years, studies have 
also shown that these financial options have drawbacks and limitations. This dichotomy 
begs the questions: First, do informal finance mechanisms actually create business 
growth and improve economic welfare for Kenyan entrepreneurs? Second, why are some 
models more effective than others? 
A. GENERAL FAILURES OF FORMAL BANKING 
Banks may not be the best option available for entrepreneurs seeking to open 
micro, small, and medium enterprises in developing countries. The typical interest rates 
of 16 percent to 21 percent put loans out of reach for many entrepreneurs.2 Additionally, 
formal financial institutions prefer to deal with clients who take out larger loans because 
the marginal costs of servicing those loans are much lower than for small loans. Even 
with their higher interest rates, many banks in the region have failed. Likewise, publicly 
administered agricultural and development banks in Cameroon, Benin, Senegal, Togo, 
and Zaire have all declared bankruptcy, and in doing so, have made people wary of doing 
                                                 
1 This thesis will primarily present research and analysis that focuses on women; however, where 
appropriate, it also includes some analysis of how informal finance supports men. 
2 Lois Stevenson and Annette St-Onge, Support for Growth-Oriented, Women Entrepreneurs in Kenya 
(Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2005), 10.  
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business with banks.3 Furthermore, formal banks tend to be located in population centers, 
so citizens in rural regions have an increased barrier to service.  
Formal banks do not effectively serve women in Kenya. According to Fridah 
Mwobobia, writing for the International Journal of Business Administration, women face 
discrimination from bank officials who ignore them and instead attempt to talk to their 
husbands or male business partners.4 This may be an inherently cultural bias; however, it 
still precludes women from enjoying full access to banking services. Despite the revision 
of inheritance laws within the Succession Act of 1981, few women today inherit land or 
other physical property.5 Only the 1 percent of women in Kenya who do own property 
would have the option to use those deeds as collateral against a loan.6 Another credit 
option is to take out a short-term credit contract with an agricultural cooperative. Again, 
this option is much more available to men. Peter Kimuyu studied a specific Kenyan 
community where 79 percent of the households took out such a contract with a coffee 
marketing cooperative society.7 Although women may benefit because they are part of a 
household where their husband receives credit, they may not individually control the 
farm goods to establish credit in their own right. Poor access to formal financial 
institutions has led many women entrepreneurs to seek out financial services from MFIs 
and local ROSCAs. 
Where there is a financial need and the government or other formal financial 
options cannot meet that need, other organizations have stepped in to fill the gap. John 
Akoten, Yasuyuki Sawada, and Keijiro Otsuka, in a study of how credit affects small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs), found that, with perhaps devastating consequences, a lack of 
                                                 
3 Frits J. A. Bouman, “Rotating and Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations: A Development 
Perspective,” World Development 23, no. 3 (1995): 373.  
4 Fridah M. Mwobobia, “The Challenges Facing Small-Scale Women Entrepreneurs: A Case of 
Kenya,” International Journal of Business Administration 3, no. 2 (2012): 115.  
5 Ibid.  
6 Ibid., 114.  
7 Peter Kiko Kimuyu, “Rotating Saving and Credit Associations in Rural East Africa,” World 
Development 27, no. 7 (1999): 1301.  
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credit reduces private investment in Africa.8 Because of this reality, the failure of many 
government-subsidized programs whose expressed purpose was to administer rural credit 
spurred the growth of informal credit to reduce the access barrier.9 The government 
should support informal finance programs because they have the potential to help grow 
the economy when other formal services are lacking.  
B. WHY BUSINESS GROWTH AND INCREASED INDIVIDUAL 
ECONOMIC WELFARE MATTER 
Growth is key to the future development of Africa, and alternative finance might 
be a way to facilitate that growth. Despite criticisms of foreign aid programs, aid is likely 
to remain in place for the foreseeable future in Africa. So, a determination that a MFI or 
ROSCA would be better suited to serve the needs of entrepreneurs is a valuable finding. 
If informal finance can be proven to create economic growth in Kenya, aid programs 
would likely consider making larger investments in informal finance. Finally, policy 
makers at the highest levels have recently focused on economic policies. President 
Obama’s participation in the sixth global entrepreneurship summit in 2015, during his 
visit to Kenya, highlights a growing focus on entrepreneurship.10  
Some of these informal finance mechanisms might have also helped business 
owners increase their individual wealth. This would be an important finding, because an 
increase in income could potentially help pay for education and medical care. For an 
individual, or their family members, the ability to access these services might have been 
out of reach without the help of informal finance.   
Especially within the developing world, would-be entrepreneurs often fight uphill 
battles to start their businesses. One of the main problems that Kenyan entrepreneurs—
                                                 
8 John E. Akoten, Yasuyuki Sawada, and Keijiro Otsuka, “The Determinants of Credit Access and Its 
Impacts on Micro and Small Enterprises: The Case of Garment Producers in Kenya,” Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 54, no. 4 (2006): 927.  
9 Rosemary Atieno, Formal and Informal Institutions’ Lending Policies and Access to Credit by 
Small-Scale Enterprises in Kenya: An Empirical Assessment, Vol. 111 (Nairobi, Kenya: African Economic 
Research Consortium, 2001), 11.  
10 Augustus Muluvi, Paul Odhiambo and Manaseh Otieno, “Deepening Kenya-U.S. Relations: 




male or female—identify is lack of access to financial services. For micro, small, and 
medium enterprises, the preponderance of business owners are women. For these women, 
who may face multiple hurdles to secure formal financing, more informal options like 
microfinance and ROSCAs may present their best options for starting businesses.  
C. CHARACTERIZING MICRO, SMALL, AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES 
The characterization of micro, small, or medium enterprises varies globally. They 
can be registered or unregistered. Small and medium enterprises are often combined 
under the umbrella of SMEs; likewise, micro and small enterprises can be grouped 
together as micro and small enterprises (MSEs). Typically, SMEs have fewer than five 
workers and are started on a budget of less than $35,000. For example, in Australia, small 
enterprises are businesses that have fewer than 20 employees. In the European Union, 
SMEs must meet any two of the three following criteria: fewer than 20 workers, balance 
sheet value below $800,000, or turnover below $800,000.11 These definitions are 
important because much of the research focuses on a specific size of business.  
Within various research efforts, enterprises in Kenya have been segregated into 
distinct categories that better reflect the local nature of business. In the available research, 
and in contrast to Europe, there seems to be little emphasis on categorizing enterprises by 
earnings in Kenya. When describing Kenyan SMEs, Mwobobia does break out distinct 
categories. His study identifies small enterprises as those with 10–50 employees and 
medium enterprises as those with 51–99 employees.12 Any enterprise with fewer than 10 
employees is a microenterprise. Many farmers would logically fall into the 
microenterprise category, but generally farmers are not considered as entrepreneurs 
unless they sell or barter their goods.13 Agricultural workers who personally consume 
their goods are better characterized as subsistence farmers. Stevenson classifies a woman 
entrepreneur as a woman who starts, actively manages, and owns at least a 50 percent 
                                                 
11 Mwobobia, “The Challenges Facing Small-Scale,” 113–114.  
12 Ibid., 114.  
13 Stevenson and St-Onge, Support for Growth, 4.  
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stake in a business.14 Stevenson’s definition also qualifies that the business must have 
been in operation for over a year. 
Entrepreneurs in Kenya contribute greatly to the growth and development of the 
Kenyan economy. In the International Journal of Social Entrepreneurship and 
Innovation, Ashley Francis, Abdalla Nassar, and Khanjan Meta report that, as of 2013, 
Kenyan small-scale enterprise accounts for 17 percent to 28 percent of adult 
employment.15 From 1999–2002, the MSE sector generated 675,000 jobs annually.16 
Given the mounting evidence, the Kenyan government saw the potential for growth and 
job generation and publicly committed to “integrating the MSE sector into the national 
economic grid.”17 Kenya’s Vision 2030, which was laid out in 2012, describes plans to 
create five SME parks that focus on different sectors, including metals and agro-
processing, though little progress seems to have been made so far.18 From 2000–2002 the 
MSE sector experienced a boom in growth “increasing to 2.8 million enterprises and 
MSE employment of 5.1 million persons, accounting  for 74.2 per cent of total 
employment.”19 In 2001, Rosemary Atieno, writing for the African Economic Research 
Consortium, found that small-scale enterprise accounts for 12–14 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP).20 Furthermore, she found that since 70 percent of these 
enterprises are located in rural areas, growing these businesses is a valuable option to 
spur rural development.21 According to a Kenyan economic survey conducted in 2005, 
small-scale enterprises contributed over 50 percent of all the new jobs created that year.22 
                                                 
14 Mwobobia, “The Challenges Facing Small-Scale,” 114.  
15 Ashley Francis, Abdalla Nassar, and Khanjan Mehta. “Are We Formal Yet? The Evolving Role of 
Informal Lending Mechanisms to Support Entrepreneurship and Poverty Alleviation in Central Kenya.” 
International Journal of Social Entrepreneurship and Innovation 2, no. 2 (2013): 112.  
16 Stevenson and St-Onge, Support for Growth, 3.  
17 Ibid.  
18 Kenya Vision 2030, “Development of SME Parks: Project Profile,” accessed August 27, 2016, 
http://www.vision2030.go.ke/projects/?pj=39.  
19 Stevenson and St-Onge, Support for Growth, 4.  
20 Atieno, Formal and Informal Institutions’ Lending Policies, 3.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Mwobobia, “The Challenges Facing Small-Scale,” 113.  
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It is obvious that these enterprises have done great things for Kenya, and yet 
entrepreneurs still encounter difficulties. 
Despite nascent government attempts to encourage growth, businesses seem 
trapped at the micro and small level. There is a relative dearth of medium sized 
businesses with 11–50 employees (Figure 1). The statistics are even worse for women in 
bigger businesses. When broken down by gender, it is estimated that fewer than 20 
percent of medium size businesses are woman-owned, which equates to only 0.3 percent 
of all MSEs.23 Among the enterprises Stevenson and St-Onge studied, the owner is the 
sole employee for 85 percent of women-owned businesses.24 This seems to indicate that 
either micro and small enterprises simply are incapable of growing into the medium level, 
or that there are impediments to the growth of these enterprises that need to be addressed, 
especially when it comes to women.  




                                                 
23 Stevenson and St-Onge, Support for Growth, 8.  
24 Ibid.  
25 Source: Stevenson and St-Onge, Support for Growth, 5.   
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Among several other options, reducing or removing financial barriers for those 
who work in SMEs and MSEs addresses a growth limitation. Mwobobia identified lack 
of credit as “one of the most serious constraints facing SMEs and hindering their 
development.”26 However, simply throwing money at the problem will not solve it 
completely. Ideally, informal or formal finance solutions must be responsive to the needs, 
expectations, and culture of Kenyans. Family is a crucial social link in African society. 
Within Kenya 80 percent of MSE employment involved only owners and family 
members.27 So, an ideal solution would not create tension within families. About two-
thirds of Kenyan MSEs operate in rural areas, which is also where up to 80 percent of the 
population lives and where the services of commercial banks are limited.28 The relative 
lack of formal financing options in rural areas creates an artificial constraint to service. 
This helps explain why Atieno found that entrepreneurs more frequently used informal 
credit sources than formal ones.29 On the continent of Africa, women own almost 
50 percent of all enterprises.30 Since women have limited access to formal banking, and 
formal banking is also less prevalent in rural areas, an informal finance mechanism that 
addresses both issues can provide a solution. 
D. CHOOSING KENYA FOR RESEARCH 
Kenya, located in eastern Africa, borders Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, 
Uganda, and Tanzania. Gaining independence in 1964, Kenya is a relatively new 
republic. Its coastline along the Indian Ocean provides easy access to global value chains 
when compared with land-locked countries in Africa. Home to approximately 45 million 
people,31 Kenya is regionally important and has a diversified economy. It plays a central 
                                                 
26 Mwobobia, “The Challenges Facing Small-Scale,” 114.  
27 Stevenson and St-Onge, Support for Growth, 4.  
28 Ibid.  
29 Atieno, Formal and Informal Institutions’ Lending Policies, 33.  
30 Francis, Nassar, and Mehta, “Are We Formal Yet?,” 116.  
31 World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” 2014, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data//reports.aspx?source=2&country=KEN&series=&period=#.  
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role in regional transport, communications infrastructure, and financial services.32 
Nevertheless, the country faces several looming problems. Recent terrorist attacks have 
created uncertainty, hurt prospects for growth in tourism, and potentially deterred foreign 
investors. Agriculture, which contributes greatly to Kenya’s GDP, is highly susceptible to 
adverse weather. Kenya’s vast ethnic diversity can also be a source of conflict. Because 
of its rapid growth and regional importance, investing in businesses that are not as 
heavily exposed to the aforementioned risks will pay dividends in the future. 
Despite the challenges it faces, Kenya’s economy continues to grow. In 2014, 
Kenya posted its highest GDP to date, totaling approximately $61 billion U.S. dollars.33 
In recent years, percent GDP growth has ranged from 1 percent to 8 percent (Figure 2).34 
Additionally, Kenya’s per capita gross national income (GNI) purchasing power parity 
(PPP) is steadily increasing. Measured at $2,890 international dollars in 2014 (Figure 3), 
this statistic compares the purchasing power of a Kenyan dollars spent in Kenya to that of 
an equivalent U.S. dollar spent in the United States.35 Rising incomes mean a greater 
portion of Kenyans will have income to either start businesses or purchase goods from 
entrepreneurs.  
 
                                                 
32 Alexandra Dumitru, “Country Report: Kenya,” Rabobank, September 9, 2014, 
https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2014/september/country%2Dreport%2Dkenya/.  
33 World Bank, “Kenya: Country at a Glance,” accessed April 14, 2016, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kenya.  
34 World Bank, “World Development Indicators.”   
35 Ibid. 
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Figure 2.  Kenya’s GDP Growth (Annual %).36 
 
 
Figure 3.  Kenya GNI per Capita, PPP (Current International $)37 
 
 
Despite its growing economy, Kenya does not rank favorably for business and 
entrepreneurship. Reforms in this area could greatly improve outcomes for businesses. 
According to the Legatum index, Kenya ranks 101 of 142 nations for entrepreneurship 
                                                 
36 Adapted from: Legatum Institute, The 2014 Legatum Prosperity Index: Kenya Country Factsheet 
[Kenya Country Factsheet] (London: Legatum Institute, 2014), 
http://media.prosperity.com/2014/pdf/country_profiles/KEN.pdf.  



























































and opportunity.38 This ranking not only quantifies opportunity, but also measures the 
ability of individuals to start and run businesses, considering things like startup costs and 
Internet bandwidth.39 For those who do manage to start a business, they encounter 
roadblocks. As of 2014, Rabobank rates Kenya 129 of 185 for ease of doing business.40 
Some roadblocks are easier to mitigate than others. Before any business can grow, it must 
successfully open. The World Bank ranks Kenya 151 of 189 nations for businesses 
startups (Figure 4). The World Bank identified access to credit as one key limitation to 
entrepreneurship in Kenya; since alternative finance can provide access to credit, it is a 
valuable solution to explore. 
Figure 4.  Rankings on Doing Business in Kenya41  
 
 
After conducting a review of the available research relating to informal finance in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), several nations stand out. When compared with other nations, 
Kenya seems to have more informal finance studies to consider; it also boasts a relatively 
                                                 
38 Legatum Institute, Kenya Country Factsheet.  
39 Legatum Institute, The 2014 Legatum Prosperity Index Report: Mobility and Opportunity Bring 
Prosperity (London: Legatum Institute, 2014), 
http://media.prosperity.com/2014/pdf/publications/PI2014Brochure_WEB.pdf, 20.   
40 Dumitru, “Country Report: Kenya.”  
41 Source: World Bank, Doing Business 2016: Measuring Regulatory Quality and Efficiency 
(Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2016), 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/kenya/~/media/giawb/doing%20business/documents/
profiles/country/KEN.pdf?ver=3, 9.  
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robust formal banking network. Francis, Nassar, and Mehta wrote in their review of the 
evolving role of informal lending in Africa that Kenya’s banking and formal financial 
sectors are “among the most developed in Sub-Saharan Africa.”42  Kenya hosts 45 
separate financial institutions—43 commercial banks and two mortgage finance 
companies—which serve 22 percent of adults in Kenya.43 Despite it being a regional 
leader, her research also noted that 70 percent of all adult Kenyans do not have a bank 
account.44 
In Kenya, gender tends to be associated with the type of financial services that 
people use. Men lean toward formal finance and, conversely, women are more likely to 
choose the robust informal sector where ROSCAs and microfinance are more prevalent. 
Reviewing access and exclusion to financial services in Kenya and Uganda, Susan 
Johnson and Max Nino-Zarazua found ROSCAS dominating the informal sector in 
Kenya meant that women actually had greater access, when considering the whole 
financial landscape, than men.45 Thus, the issues that preclude women from formal 
baking do not appear to have the same impeding effect for informal banking. 
Within Kenya, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) employ 75 percent of those 
with jobs who in turn earn 22 percent of GDP. Therefore, because microfinance supports 
SMEs, expanding microfinance should increase employment opportunities and GDP as a 
second-order effect. To break down sectors that contribute to GDP within Kenya: 30 
percent comes from agriculture, 20 percent comes from industry, and 50 percent comes 
from services.46 While data for unemployment within Kenya is hard to find, the World 
Bank and the Legatum index estimates it to be on the order of 9.2 percent.47 In 2005, 43.7 
                                                 
42 Francis, Nassar, and Mehta, “Are We Formal Yet?,” 112.  
43 Ibid.  
44 Ibid. 
45 Susan Johnson and Max Nino-Zarazua, “Financial Access and Exclusion in Kenya and Uganda,” 
The Journal of Development Studies 47, no. 3 (2011): 476.  
46 World Bank, “World Development Indicators.”  
47 Legatum Institute, “The 2015 Legatum Prosperity Index: Kenya Country Profile,” 2015, 
http://www.prosperity.com/#!/country/KEN.   
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percent of Kenyans lived below the $1.25 a day (PPP) international poverty line.48 
Through microfinance the unemployed can facilitate their self-employment, which will 
raise living standards and ultimately boost GDP.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Though some Kenyans may employ both financial options in their lifetimes, as 
essential background information, it is important to briefly review how each one operates. 
Microfinance and ROSCAs are generally distinct financial options that borrowers may 
seek. Microfinance is typically a resource available to entrepreneurs that is facilitated by 
microfinance institutions (MFIs). Some MFIs include both savings and loans programs. 
Typically, the loans are for very small amounts, and they are given to entrepreneurs who 
would like to build their small businesses. Often, the intended purpose of these loans to 
entrepreneurs centers around the purchase of a capital good, like a sewing machine, 
though some MFIs choose to loan to anyone in need irrespective of how the loan will be 
employed. ROSCAs are savings groups. They are much more informal than MFIs and 
have no institutionalized management, though most will have a group leader. In general, 
each group member puts a small amount into a pot on a periodic basis, and then gets one 
turn to take home the combined pot. Though ROSCAs can be formed with specific 
purchases in mind, spending is determined by the individual. Of note, because ROSCAs 
are generally organized within a community or group of friends, there is tremendous 
cultural pressure to attend every meeting and have the required contribution in hand. 
Conversely, Kenyans may not perceive a debt to an NGO-sponsored MFI loan as an 
important debt, but one that should be paid after debts to family and community.    
This thesis will present specific background information about MFIs and 
ROSCAs; then evaluate each option independently in separate chapters. The analysis of 
each alternative finance method will begin with general information. Then the analysis of 
available studies, within the respective chapter, will focus on positive findings for 
business growth and improved economic welfare. Finally, each chapter presents negative 
findings or areas for improvement.  
                                                 
48 World Bank, “World Development Indicators.”  
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Microfinance is presented in Chapter II as a fairly new financial option for 
entrepreneurs. The existing research on microfinance has found mixed results, especially 
with respect to female entrepreneurs. There is not enough data to do cross-case 
comparisons on this population. With that in mind, valuable insight may be gained by 
focusing on researching the specific case of the Kenya Women’s Finance Trust (KWFT). 
One of the few organizations that has been in place for decades, the KWFT is also among 
the most studied of the various microfinance institutions in Kenya, and it has produced 
some of the most positive results. For these reasons, it represents an influential case. By 
referring to various studies and journal articles, this thesis will attempt to tease out some 
of the specific things that the KWFT does differently than other microfinance institutions, 
which may suggest ways in which others could modify their programs to achieve 
beneficial results. Based on the preliminary research, many microfinance institutions are 
not set up with specific goals, and they often lack the education and training mechanisms 
that the KWFT has put in place. Therefore, highlighting the successes that the KWFT has 
had is key; however, it will take more in-depth research to develop reliable data 
identifying the causal factors and building a larger baseline for comparison purposes.  
ROSCAs are analyzed in Chapter III as a longstanding informal finance 
mechanism. ROSCAs represent a typical case of alternative finance in Kenya. They are 
prevalent worldwide and in Africa. For the chapter on ROSCAs, the thesis research and 
analysis will focus primarily on journal articles that have studied these groups. First, it 
will survey the various forms of ROSCAs, then make the case that they are a culturally 
relevant model in Kenya. The preliminary data suggests that ROSCAs are more prevalent 
in certain segments of the population and among those who lack other financial options. 
However, there are outlier groups that do not fit the typical framework. Existing research 
suggests that, although ROSCAs are not typically formed to serve women entrepreneurs, 
they have the capacity to do so. As a prevalent and culturally relevant model, it may be 
possible to adapt the framework to better serve entrepreneurs. 
The final chapter will compare the two alternative finance options, present general 
conclusions, and identify the emerging technological realities in Sub-Saharan Africa that 
may influence microfinance and ROSCAs. Some of the best practices of one option may 
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be leveraged to improve another. The inclusion of these best practices indicates the 
relative strength of each financial model.  
In general, many authors have studied informal finance, and these authors 
articulate both positive and negative findings. Much debate exists within the existing 
research. As a relatively new field, MFIs do not have a long history of study in Africa. 
For ROSCAs, because there is no obligation to use the money to build businesses, it is 
difficult to find research that specifically details how ROSCAs serve entrepreneurs. 
Through comparison and analysis, however, several things become clear. First, both 
MFIs and ROSCAs have the potential to create growth and improve economic welfare. 
However, entrepreneur-centered MFIs tend to create better business outcomes, and 
ROSCAs more broadly serve individual welfare needs. Second, by adhering more closely 
to and leveraging cultural norms, ROSCAs have lower transaction costs. Given the high 
interest rates of microfinance, exploring options to lower transaction cost is a valuable 
pursuit that could make existing and future MFIs more desirable financial options for 
Kenyans. Finally, based upon their long history, ROSCAs are likely to endure for the 
foreseeable future; similarly, MFIs will continue to operate in Kenya so long as they 
remain at least cash neutral or are supported by governments or non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). However, the evolving landscape of financial technology in 
Africa, including M-PESA in Kenya, presents new financial options that may become 
even more appealing in the future. In the end, Kenyan entrepreneurs will choose the 




A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Multiple studies show that the KWFT has been able to facilitate both business 
growth and improved welfare among the clients it serves. The KWFT, in particular, is a 
good example of a MFI that creates both of these positive outcomes because it chooses to 
focus on entrepreneurs, whereas a MFI that serves clients with a less directed aim is less 
likely to produce business growth. In general terms, the case for microfinance creating 
improved welfare is strong. By serving segments of the Kenyan population that formal 
institutions do not, microfinance can serve the previously unmet financial needs of 
the growing Kenyan population. Microfinance also comes with its share of problems; 
finding solutions to those problems will help ensure its continued availability as an option 
to entrepreneurs in need. Microfinance institutions vary greatly; however, so after 
presenting general MFI background information, this chapter will analyze the KWFT 
in depth. 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Microfinance is defined as “the supply of loans, savings, money transfers, 
insurance, and other financial services to low-income people.”49 Microfinance is a fairly 
new financial option. It originated in Asia in the 1970s, which partially explains why 
Africa lags behind Asia and Latin American in program development.50 Finding rigorous 
and conclusive data citing a causal relationship between microfinance and 
entrepreneurship within Africa is difficult, given its relatively short history. The terms 
microcredit and microsavings fall under the umbrella of microfinance. Microcredit is also 
referred to as microloans in a number of articles, so, within this paper, those terms are 
                                                 
49 Anne-Lucie Lafourcade et al., Overview of the Outreach and Financial Performance of 
Microfinance Institutions in Africa (Washington, DC: Microfinance Information eXchange, 2005), 
http://afraca.org/download/afraca_kmp’s_regional_experiences/Outreach-and-Financial-Performance-of-
Microfinance-Institutions-in-Africa-An-Overview-by-Anne-Lucie-Lafourcade-et-al.pdf, 2.    
50 George O. K’Aol, “The Role of Microfinance in Fostering Women Entrepreneurship in Kenya,” 
International Council for Small Business (ICSB) World Conference Proceedings (Halifax, Nova Scotia: 
International Council for Small Business, 2008).  
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considered synonyms. Typically, loans are small, on the order of $100 or less, and given 
to those who have very low income. 
By all accounts, the first and most well-known microfinance institution was the 
Grameen Bank, which was founded in Bangladesh in the mid-1970s. Though not without 
critics, Grameen Bank has been widely celebrated for its ability to create profits and 
social goods.51 In recognition of its perceived ability to create social good, the Grameen 
Bank and Muhammad Yunus, its founder, jointly won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006.52  
As of April 2016, the bank had served 8.8 million individuals, of whom 97 percent were 
women; the bank also loaned money to 1.3 million groups.53 There are several reasons 
why it makes sense to loan to groups over individuals; however, that will be discussed in 
subsequent chapters. 
C. PREVALENCE OF MICROFINANCE 
Microfinance is prevalent globally. In 1999, the World Bank reported that 
25 million borrowers financed their business endeavors through microfinance, and by 
2010 microfinance served 150 million globally.54 According to Berhanu Nega and 
Geoffery Schneider’s article, in 2009 the 20 largest MFIs served 47 million people.55 
Microfinance is therefore common and growing. In 2010, microloans from the top 50 
MFIs totaled $5.4 billion.56 Though the individual loan amounts may be low, several 
large microfinance institutions serve large portions of the market. 
                                                 
51 Abjijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo, Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight 
Global Poverty (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 166.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Grameen Bank, “2016-07,” Grameen Bank Monthly Update in US$ 1, no. 439 (2016), 
http://grameen.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=453&Itemid=527.   
54 Clemencia Osa Ouma and Charles M. Rambo, “Effects of Access to Microcredit on the Growth of 
Women-Owned Small and Medium Enterprises in the Central Business District of Kismu: The Case of 
Kenya Women Finance Trust,” Institute for Business & Finance Research, Global Conference on Business 
and Finance Proceedings 8, no. 1 (2013): 2.     
55 Berhanu Nega and Geoffrey Schneider, “Social Entrepreneurship, Microfinance, and Economic 
Development in Africa,” Journal of Economic Issues 48 no. 2 (2014): 369.  
56 Ibid., 369.  
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Microfinance is growing within Africa, but it still faces obstacles to that growth. 
Globally, African MFIs have the most borrowers and savers per staff member.57 Within 
Africa, where savings accounts outnumber loans 3:1, the lower overhead on 
administering savings accounts may explain the disparity. For a personal savings account 
the incentive to manage the money proactively is with the saver, whereas for a loan the 
more interested party is bank that collects interest and payments on the debt. In terms of 
cost per borrower, efficiency is lower in African microfinance than in other global 
regions.58 The lower efficiency is understandable. Many nations in Africa have very 
weak infrastructure. Extensive logistics and coordination may be required to reach those 
most in need. By comparison, in a country like India, high population density facilitates 
access and drives administrative costs down. Finding low-income areas with high 
population density and little access to credit would be a great strategy for MFIs looking 
to find a pool of borrowers with lower overhead. According to Lafourcade et al., although 
“the overall financial performance of MFIs in Africa lags behind other global regions, a 
growing number of MFIs—especially regulated and cooperative MFIs—are profitable.”59 
If the already growing number of MFIs can be designed to be more profitable, it is 
reasonable to assume that they will continue to be a resource for credit and savings within 
Africa, at least in the near future. 
D. LEGAL STATUS OF MICROFINANCE 
In the 1990s, the government of Kenya began to move toward policies that 
supported informal financing by extending resources to improve infrastructure and 
channel credit to the microfinance industry.60 Kenya went a step beyond other nations by 
setting up a formal legal structure to regulate microfinance. In 2016, the Brookings 
Institution rated Kenya the highest among the 26 financially underserved nations it 
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59 Ibid., 14. 
60 Washington K. Kiiru and Glenn D. Pederson, Kenya Women Finance Trust: Case Study of a Micro-




evaluated for use and access to affordable financial services.61 Bureaucracy can often be 
seen as an impediment to growth, but in this case it can be viewed as tacit government 
support. Combined with microfinance regulations on deposit-taking institutions that went 
into effect in 2008, the Microfinance Act of 2006 is the foundation for government 
regulation achieved by licensing and supervision. The Central Bank of Kenya expects 
that microfinance “will play a pivotal role in deepening financial markets and enhancing 
access to financial services and products.”62 
The Microfinance Act of 2006 subdivides MFIs within Kenya into deposit-taking, 
credit-only, and informal organizations. The KWFT falls into the final category. In 
comparison, deposit-taking institutions are directly licensed and regulated and are subject 
to higher levels of scrutiny by the Central Bank of Kenya. They are also “permitted to 
mobilize and intermediate (or lend) deposits from the general public.”63 In contrast, 
credit-only institutions simply loan shareholder or other borrowed funds. Informal 
organizations, which the central bank does not explicitly regulate, are those such as 
NGOs.  
Kenya embraces microfinance, yet 30 percent of Kenyans have no access to 
financial services of any kind.64 This lack of access shows just how much future outreach 
is possible. In 2013, 52 MFIs, whose expressed purpose was reaching the unbanked poor, 
served 6.5 million clients and controlled $310 million in assets within Kenya. Today, 
MixMarket, an online microfinance database, tracks Kenyan loans totaling $3.3 billion 
U.S. over 1.5 million borrowers and $3.8 billion in savings deposits spread over 10.6 
                                                 
61 John D. Villasenor, Darrel M. West, and Robin J. Lewis, The 2016 Brookings Financial and Digital 
Inclusion Project Report: Advancing Equitable Financial Ecosystems (Washington, DC: Brookings Center 
for Innovation Technology, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/08/fdip_20160816_project_report.pdf, 64. 
62 Central Bank of Kenya, “Microfinance Institutions,” accessed August 30, 2015, 
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63 Central Bank of Kenya, “Bank Supervision,” accessed 26 August 2015, 
https://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/banksupervision#microfinance-banks. 
64 Odongo Kodongo, and Lilian G. Kendi. “Individual Lending Versus Group Lending: An Evaluation 
with Kenya’s Microfinance Data.” Review of Development Finance 3, no. 2 (2013): 99.  
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million depositors.65 The obvious and prevalent growth of microfinance should be 
viewed as an opportunity for governments to create sound foundational economic policy. 
Interestingly enough, not all nations set up legal frameworks for MFIs; others do 
not formally regulate MFIs. Even without the formal codification that exists in Kenya, 
microfinance remains a crucial resource within Africa. For instance, of small and medium 
enterprises within Ghana, 80 percent received credit from private MFIs, and 9.3 percent 
received credit from private non-profit organizations.66 MFIs can be classified as private 
or public as well as profit or nonprofit, and various organizations like established banks, 
cooperatives, NGOs, and postal financial institutions can—and already do—administer 
microfinance. The presence of legal frameworks and regulations, or the lack thereof, 
appear to have very little impact on an individual’s desire to access credit and savings.  
E. TYPICAL MICROFINANCE OPERATIONS 
To serve their customers, MFIs have several instruments at their disposal, 
primarily savings and loans. As previously stated, saving is popular in Africa with a 2003 
survey of 163 MFIs reporting 6.3 million savers in comparison with 2.4 million 
borrowers.67 Saving is therefore almost three times more prevalent than borrowing. 
Anne-Lucie Lafourcade et al. report in their overview of global microfinance, “African 
MFIs lead the world in savings mobilization, in both the number of clients served and the 
absolute volume of savings on deposit.”68 Furthermore, they convey that 70 percent of 
MFIs in Africa report savings as a core service and key to fund lending.69 Savings 
therefore facilitate loans and are essential to the continued success of the industry. 
                                                 
65 MixMarket, “Kenya Market Profile,” accessed August 30, 2015, 
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68 Ibid., 14.  
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Globally, microcredit supported 30 million small and medium businesses over the last 30 
years.70 
F. CHARACTERIZING MICROFINANCE CLIENTS 
A key consideration for new microfinance institutions is who utilizes and benefits 
from them. In general, women are much more likely to make use of microfinance. 
According to Lafourcade et al., in 2003 women represented 61 percent of African MFI 
borrowers,71 though data on women may be a bit skewed because some NGOs 
specifically seek out or serve women. The Kenya Women’s Finance Trust (KWFT) is a 
prime example of targeted MFI that “was established to provide credit to women clients 
who did not have access to credit from commercial banks and other financial 
institution.”72 The organization was started by successful women who wished to 
empower the success of other women and not explicitly because women had a greater 
financial need than men. Since women make up 60–70 percent of Kenya’s poor,73 the 
trust’s decision to serve only women impacted a larger percentage of low-income 
Kenyans than a decision to serve only men. Though not by design, the KWFT served the 
more vulnerable market segment. 
A number of factors drive low-income individuals to seek microfinance. 
Traditional banks may not be staffed to administer small loans that earn little interest, so 
some do not offer them. These banks are also reluctant to lend to those who lack 
collateral in the event of default. Low literacy rates are another barrier that manifests 
itself when applicants are unable fill out paperwork. However, the problem can be very 
basic: in many rural areas there are no banks. Although less often the case in Kenya, for 
cultural or religious reasons African women may be uncomfortable dealing with men, 
                                                 
70 Ouma and Rambo, “Effects of Access to Microcredit,” 2.  
71 Lafourcade et al., Overview of the Outreach, 1.  
72 Kiiru and Pederson, Kenya Women Finance Trust, 28.  
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who are predominantly the employees at banks. Microfinance can facilitate access to 
credit for those who would not ordinarily have it. Access to credit is often the stumbling 
point for business creation, globally and in Africa. This is further underscored by the 
38.2 percent of Kenyans that identify business startup costs as a barrier.74 
Because of the force multiplier effect that entrepreneurs have on a region’s 
economy, they are a great investment toward the future development of a nation. 
However, hoping that unencumbered microloans will create entrepreneurs is the wrong 
methodology, and the available data is still too limited to make that strong of an 
argument. Instead, the better question is this: What can entrepreneurs make of 
microfinance? Enter the KWFT.  
G. INFLUENTIAL CASE STUDY: KENYA WOMEN’S FINANCIAL TRUST 
Since 1981, the KWFT has served women entrepreneurs in need of savings and 
loans. Because of the legalities in Kenya during the 1980s, it was set up as a trust. In 
2015, as rated by the Think Business Banking Awards, the KWFT won its third 
consecutive award as the best microfinance bank in Kenya.75 Not only does the bank 
serve Kenyans, but over the years it has expanded to serve 45 other African nations.76 In 
Kenya, it is classified as an NGO and is therefore not required to pay taxes on income 
earned on interest from loans.77 Likewise as an NGO, it is not regulated by either the 
Microfinance Acts of 2006 or amplifying framework released in 2008. The trust initially 
enjoyed successful years and then entered into a period of managerial neglect. By 1995, 
the fund regained its footing and achieved a loan repayment rate of 97.4 percent.78 As of 
2014, the KWFT had a loan portfolio of $211.4 million, serving roughly 234,000 active 
borrowers; the average loan value was $901 U.S. dollars.79 
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The KWFT administers several microfinance instruments and runs a website that 
provides a wealth of information for those with access to the Internet. It administers 
accounts for parents who wish to save on the behalf of their children, adult savings, group 
savings, pre-loaded cash cards, teen savings, and student savings. With the aid of other 
NGOs and international financing, the KWFT now offers loans for education to include 
nursing school, emergencies, water and sanitation, clean energy, and agricultural loans. 
The KWFT website implies that these non-business loans exist to provide an option to 
meet individual needs without diverting funds from a business loan, but it is not explicitly 
stated. While it is not clear if these loans are given out independent of business loans, it is 
clear is that the focus of the KWFT is on women entrepreneurs.  
The KWFT provides a plethora of loans to women who are already in business. It 
delineates several circumstances under which it grants business loans: to groups seeking 
to purchase capital assets, to individuals who want to expand their businesses, and to 
clients who would like to improve their business through the purchase of sewing 
machines, vehicles, and the like. Clients may select a variety of loans (Figures 5 and 6). 
Figure 5.  KWFT Business Loan Options I80  
 
 
                                                 
80 Source: KWFT Microfinance, “Business Loan Products,” accessed August 30, 2015, 
http://kwftdtm.com/page.php?id=23.  
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Figure 6.  KWFT Business Loan Options II81  
 
 
For the KWFT, identifying high-potential individuals is key. For MFIs the ideal 
growth client is an individual from a low-income, high-population-density region of 
Kenya who needs money to start a small business. Eventually, the client would use the 
loan to grow her new small business into a large one that employs thousands and boosts 
the region out of poverty. This is a very idealistic model. Although there is surely a 
Kenyan Bill Gates or Steve Jobs waiting for that opportunity, few will rise to that level of 
success. Since limited access to capital is identified as a key problem in Kenya, providing 
access should boost the successes of entrepreneurs and allow others entry into a market 
that was otherwise closed to them.  
By lending to entrepreneurs, the KWFT is goal oriented, and its targeted approach 
limits risk. Loaning to an individual who has few skills or education, while benevolent, 
cannot be expected to generate higher magnitude effects far beyond that individual. Even 
with skills and education, entrepreneurs without business ideas are stymied. In general, if 
MFIs seek specific outcomes, it is better that they seek individuals who exhibit interest in 
achieving that matching outcome. For many, the prospect of starting a business is 
daunting. Ownership of, or participation in, a business is a minimum qualifier for a loan 
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through the KWFT (Figures 5 and 6). In essence, with this requirement the KWFT has 
restricted the availability of loans in order to lower its own risk. Additionally, for all but 
individuals who already own large-scale businesses, the KWFT provides crucial business 
skills training. In addition, selecting entrepreneurs reduces the likelihood that the funds 
are redirected for other needs. Because these women already have businesses in place, 
they have a much more realistic expectation of where they need to invest.  
A potential weakness of the research on the KWFT is that it represents an 
influential case that focused on women entrepreneurs. The difficulty in finding other 
institutions that report such success might mean that the trust represents an outlier. 
However, other MFIs may not operate similarly enough to the KWFT to produce similar 
outcomes. A second explanation for the relative lack of business growth findings among 
other MFIs may be limited research.  
H. POSITIVE RESULTS DRIVEN BY MICROFINANCE 
Multiple studies of the KWFT found that it created business growth for 
entrepreneurs. It is also one of the few organizations that has been in place for several 
decades and among the most studied microfinance institutions in Kenya. Its longstanding 
presence may help explain why so many authors reference the trust in their research. 
When compared with other MFI institutions, the KWFT represents an influential case 
because it has produced some of the most positive results for women entrepreneurs. In a 
1997 World Bank study, Kiiru and Pederson demonstrated that “[the] KWFT has been 
able to develop entrepreneurship in the coastal towns of Kwale, Kilifi, and Malindi.”82 
As a force multiplier, Idris and Agbim “found that training before taking a microcredit 
loan increases employment generation.”83 Several important findings came from Ouma 
and Rambo’s study of 190 women entrepreneurs financed by the KWFT in Kisumu, 
Kenya. Of the SMEs, 85 percent were likely to experience higher growth after receiving 
the loans. There was generally an increase in the number of workers in the SMEs, which 
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means that these loans created jobs. Ouma and Rambo also reported that 85.8 percent of 
the respondents indicated that their liabilities were decreasing.84 After borrowing from 
the KWFT, 87.4 percent experienced higher profits,85 and 80 percent of SMEs that 
received loans from the KWFT also experienced increased sales.86 The literature 
references several schemes, or loan models, that the KWFT has used over the years. 
Some of the former schemes also created positive effects at the time. Dr. K’Aol presented 
findings at the World Conference for the International Council of Small Business: 
“Entrepreneurs under the Chikola Scheme revealed significant improvement after taking 
the loan in terms business expansion and cattle ownership.”87 In the same presentation, 
he relayed that “beneficiaries under the Katikati Scheme had significant improvement in 
terms of infrastructure and net income as compared to other groups.”88 These findings 
demonstrate a pattern of positive business outcomes for the KWFT. 
Apart from business growth, several studies reveal that MFIs increase economic 
welfare. The increased economic welfare enables a host of positive outcomes. Typically, 
when individuals have more income, they are better able to take care of themselves and 
their families. While a number of these findings come specifically from studies of the 
KWFT, many authors find that MFIs are associated with positive outcomes. According to 
Ouma, in a study on the KWFT, two tertiary benefits of microfinance were an increased 
ability of women to control their reproductive health and a decrease in domestic violence 
toward women.89 The latter finding was further supported in a Nigerian study that found 
that household welfare was likely better when microfinance was provided to women over 
men.90 In a Nigerian study on poverty alleviation, Idris and Agbim found that 
microfinance was associated with better sanitation, higher child immunization rates, and 
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increased use of contraceptives among women.91 With so many Kenyans living below the 
poverty line, basic needs sometimes take priority. Additionally, those who have access to 
loans can smooth out family budgets during tough times when poverty limits access to 
food and healthcare. Idris and Agbim further reported on a study that tracked an NGO 
supporting youth development and found that “Micro-credit schemes present enormous 
potential for enhancing income generation, improving household’s living condition and 
reducing abject poverty in rural areas.”92 Poverty can be viewed as a constraint to 
education and, potentially, a trap for future poverty. A microloan can finance adult or 
childhood education. Even financing simple technical skills training provides a great 
advantage. Microfinance creates valuable secondary benefits that extend beyond those 
who save and borrow. Even if microfinance were definitively proven not to create 
entrepreneurs, other benefits would remain. Quite simply, available funds create options. 
Microfinance is an avenue for the unemployed to become self-employed.  
I. AREAS OF IMPROVEMENT FOR MICROFINANCE THAT HAVE 
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
The KWFT demonstrates the successes of microfinance. It serves as a model of 
MFI that provides a holistic approach to savings and loans for entrepreneurs. However, 
the growth of microfinance faces many challenges including high interest rates, the 
redirection of loans for personal needs, poor training and education, high operational 
costs, and barriers to land ownership. Further criticism is centered on the performance of 
women-owned businesses and whether or not microfinance can provide a way out of 
poverty. Although sometimes difficult, these obstacles have solutions. 
First, MFIs tend to charge very high interest rates. As an example, the West 
African Monetary Union caps interest at 27 percent for MFIs and 18 percent for banks. In 
general, government microloans are associated with lower interest rates,93 but 
government backed microfinance does not reach all who are in need. In a continent that 
has widespread poverty, 27 percent interest on a very small loan is still a considerable 
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sum of money for the borrower to repay. When a MFI administers a small number of low 
value loans, the overhead per loan is high. When the number of clients increases, the 
percent cost per loan decreases. Servicing even one microloan requires a minimum 
number of personnel. In reality, the same staff can cover multiple accounts, thus 
spreading out the share of administrative costs. One purported reason for these high 
interest rates is that without them the MFIs cannot cover their overhead costs. Another 
espoused reason is that high interest allows MFIs to grow, transform into banks, and 
serve a greater audience. However, there is a need to balance growth with goodwill. 
Banerjee and Duflo explained why interest rates and operational costs remain high for 
microfinance. They discovered that mitigating the risk of default limited the efficacy of 
microfinance.94 The MFI had to charge high interest rates to cover those who might 
default, and then spend its time and effort enforcing repayment; this meant that, 
eventually, the MFI might choose to loan only to known individuals.95 This reality 
created the same barriers to credit that banks present, a preference for wealthy, known 
clients. Even with their emergence and rapid growth, MFIs often have stringent 
borrowing conditions, which limits their utility.96 Akoten et al. also note that, as of 2006, 
MFIs’ terms are becoming increasingly strict.97 A growing client base combined with 
high repayment rates helps explain the KWFT’s ability to continue to operate and turn a 
profit.98 
The approach to addressing the high interest rate problem within microfinance 
deserves more innovation. Apart from seeking out a large client base to spread out the 
risk, there are other options. The first is to identify less risky individuals. No study 
mentioned formal credit scores in Kenya, but past loan repayment can be used as a proxy 
metric. Subsequent loans to individuals who meticulously repaid their previous loans 
could be made at reduced interest rates while still maintaining a safeguard against default. 
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Another option is to invest in individuals that are stakeholders in the MFI. The KWFT 
Bishara Scheme of the 1990s required those applying for a loan to save 50 Kenyan 
shillings (about 1 dollar) every week for eight weeks before a loan was authorized.99 
Mean interest rates globally vary globally (Figure 7). South Asia is a potential windfall 
for future research in the reduction of interest rates. 
Figure 7.  Global Microloan Mean Real Interest Rates100  
 
 
Next, and potentially or partially attributable to high interest rates, microloans 
generally have high default rates. Within Ghana, Kessey reports default rates of 
2.8 percent for those who repay loans monthly and 6.8 percent for those who repay 
annually.101 MFIs’ clients are typically low-net worth individuals. These loans then 
become total losses to banks because the individuals do not have collateral assets that can 
be collected in the event of a default.102 Another complication for MFIs is that the costs 
of seeking out and following up with debtors in arrears may exceed the value of the loan.  
Making matters worse, loans are diverted for personal expenses. As Kessey 
reports in Ghana, up to 23 percent of microcredit is spent on social activities.103 Small 
loans used to create small businesses, in most cases, will only generate small profits. The 
business owner must make a choice between investing in the business and gaining a 
personal benefit from the profit. It is easy to understand how impoverished business 
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owners might choose food for their family over, for instance, a new sewing machine. The 
KWFT has solved this issue by offering loan instruments to support non-business 
activities in hopes of lowering their business loan default rate. 
Education is an important foundation for development. The KWFT aims to level 
the playing field by providing business training to their borrowers. Idris and Agbim point 
out that in male-dominated societies women tend to be ignorant of how to run 
businesses.104 They then idenfity another failing: “Women entrepreneurs, especially in 
developing countries lack training, social capital, and information on markets.”105 The 
KWFT expressly sought to educate its clients. For instance, instructing good business 
practices can teach entrepreneurs that reinvestment of profits into the business can 
provide a larger margin of profit in the future. This would be one way to address the 
diversion of business loans for personal needs. The Kenyan perspective is much more 
positive than the Nigerian one: “[the] KWFT’s experience has been that non-financial 
services such as client training enhance credit management performance.”106 Idris and 
Agbim’s logic is sound, but it falls short of a complete analysis. They would advise 
against investing in those that lack the training to succeed; in contrast, the KWFT would 
train first and then loan the startup or growth capital to the entrepreneur.  
There is not an easy way to overcome the high operational costs that result from 
working in rural areas. These high expense rates can partially explain the low return rates, 
relative to other global markets, on loans within Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 8). Many of 
the costs can be attributed to a lack of infrastructure, such as roads and communication 
networks in these areas. Low population densities in rural areas also lead to limited 
outreach. NGOs experience this problem when trying to determine where their resources 
can have the most impact. A significant proportion of the very poor live rurally where it 
is less financially feasible to serve them. As MFIs grow, they could potentially offset 
high operational costs in rural areas by adding more low-operational-cost loans in areas 
of high population density. Another solution could be to convince the government to 
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improve the infrastructure, but that is an exceedingly difficult battle. A third option could 
be to persuade the local government to underwrite a portion of the loan or issue a 
government backed microloan. Lafourcade et al. analyzed 163 MFIs in Africa and found 
that, even with their high expense ratios, 77, or 47 percent, earned positive returns in 
2003.107 
Figure 8.  Return on Assets 2003108 
 
 
Another hurdle is that in parts of Africa, as in other regions of the world, women 
cannot legally own land. Since women are the majority users of microfinance 
instruments, impediments to women entrepreneurs who depend on land are especially 
problematic. Where women cannot own land, the restriction indirectly limits the types of 
business that they can open. This limitation may also explain why Idris and Agbim found 
that women have had lower performing businesses when compared with male 
entrepreneurs.109 Kessey points out a workaround in parts of Northern Ghana where men 
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buy the land and then allow their female relatives to use it for their businesses.110 
Institutional and legal reform could result in a greater percentage of women having a 
lower barrier to convert their loans into successful businesses.  
The next issue is whether the KWFT’s model of loans to women makes good 
business sense. In Nigeria, Idris and Agbim report that women-owned businesses tend to 
underperform when compared directly to male-owned businesses.111 The implication is 
that women are a less desirable investment than men are. However, Ouma and Rambo 
point out that in Kenya women exhibit “preference towards certain business lines such as 
clothing boutiques and tailoring shops.”112 Directly comparing women to male 
entrepreneurs is an oversimplification. The difference in outcome can be viewed as a 
difference in what the groups prefer to invest.  
Kessey puts forth a relatively simplistic analysis that SME entrepreneurs do not 
generate enough income to pull themselves out of poverty.113 His contention is that they 
will then seek additional microloans to fund their businesses. Microfinance has been 
linked with many positive outcomes that cannot be measured in financial terms. 
Unfortunately, within Africa there is not convincing evidence that access to microcredit 
raises income levels on average. Even within successfully operated microfinance 
programs, there is not a definitive linkage between poverty alleviation and 
microfinance.114 Kessey ignores several points. Any rise in income that did not exceed 
the $1.25 per day barrier would not meet Kessey’s measure of improvement. However, 
he makes a very valid point in that not every SME will be successful. Guaranteed 
financing does not ensure success. 
Finally, if the goal of microfinance programs is business creation, an innovative 
strategy would be to offer a business instead of a loan. One of the most widely known 
businesses that follows this model in the United States is Mary Kay, and there are a few 
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companies that follow this model in Africa. One example, Solar Sister, sells solar lighting 
to replace kerosene lamps on consignment and another is Living Goods, which sells clean 
cook stoves, bed nets, and soap.115 They each operate by providing women with products 
ready for the market. Starting a business is a difficult thing to do. Providing a business 
model upfront may be a better strategy than providing a microloan. 
J. CRITICISMS OF MICROFINANCE  
There are several very legitimate criticisms of microfinance that have no obvious 
solutions. In The White Man’s Burden, William Easterly found that microcredit solved 
only the narrow problem of access to credit; it was not the panacea that other authors 
made it out to be.116 Microfinance therefore should be used in concert with other 
comprehensive reforms. Microfinance is better viewed as one of many tools to work 
toward creating entrepreneurs and subsequently bettering their lives.  
Widespread, documented, and statistically significant job creation resulting from 
microfinance would prove the connection, but there is no certain proof for now. Through 
statistical analysis Van Rooyen et al. find, “There is little evidence that micro-credit has 
any impact on job creation.”117 They begins their analysis with over 6,000 data points, 
and are only able to cite two studies that that correlate microfinance and job creation. The 
first study in 2001 found a significant positive correlation, and the second did not find 
any statistically significant relationship. The study points out that the results could have 
been impacted by regional instability and economic crises.118 On the whole, two data 
points can hardly confirm or refute a hypothesis. Instead, research should seek out 
successful cases, like the KWFT, and model those within new MFIs. 
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Another criticism is that MFI-supported SMEs cannot access global markets. 
Microfinance was never intended to back large enterprises that can more easily access 
global markets. Compounding the problem, SMEs do not have the market share or 
organizational ability to set market prices, so they must deal with them.119 However, 
there is room for transformation in this arena as well. In the United States, Etsy connects 
many micro industries to a single Internet-based marketplace. Similarly, the 10,000 
Villages Shop sells fair trade goods made by disadvantaged artisans in the developing 
world.120 Although this approach faces barriers in Kenya due to limitations of the 
communications network and high cost for individuals to purchase and operate 
computers, it is reasonable to see how the concept could be successfully employed and 
expanded in the future.  
Critics point out that the burgeoning micro industries created by microfinance 
have not grown into large-scale industries. Again, this is a generalization, but still a valid 
problem for job creation. Nega and Schneider point out, “Social entrepreneurship diverts 
financial resources and talented individuals from other development initiatives … 
microfinance tends to reduce funding for larger-scale enterprises that might actually 
develop into significant engines of job creation.”121 Instead, microfinance fills a niche, 
the loans are not large enough to purchase expensive machinery or pay for the rent of a 
large warehouse, nor are they intended to. This is a topic that warrants further research, as 
lack of data could be to blame for the current ambiguity. Furthermore, only a small 
percentage of businesses grow to be giants. With microfinance’s short history in Kenya, 
this transformation may be seen in the future. 
K. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Since the 1970s, microfinance has become increasingly common. Kenya, in 
particular, has taken steps to develop strong support for their financial sector and 
entrepreneurs. Though certain MFIs, like the KWFT, have had success creating positive 
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outcomes for both business growth and economic welfare, most MFIs do not report this 
same level of positive outcomes for entrepreneurs. Generally, a review of the available 
research reveals that MFIs create positive personal welfare outcomes but relatively few 
meaningful business outcomes. This difference can be explained, in part, by the fact the 
KWFT offered training and specifically focused on women entrepreneurs. In that way, its 
lending practices were goal oriented. The KWFT also chose to lend to individuals who 
were similarly goal oriented. Both client and lender had an interest in growing 
businesses. Going forward, MFIs that wish to create business success should follow the 




III. ROTATING SAVINGS AND CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
In the preponderance of cases, ROSCA membership is correlated with improved 
economic welfare for Kenyans; however, the argument for ROSCA membership being a 
primary causal factor of business growth is less clear and more layered. In simple terms, 
ROSCAs provide a savings mechanism. Therefore, those Kenyans who participate are 
more or less guaranteed to receive a windfall payment that they can choose to spend as 
they see fit. Many Kenyans choose to spend the money they receive on education, 
healthcare, or improving their living conditions, all of which indicate that ROSCAs 
contribute to increased economic welfare. Because ROSCAs, unlike MFIs, are formed 
within communities and among friends, there is less formal tracking of how and in what 
ways the money is spent. Likewise, placing any restrictions on how the money is 
eventually spent or allocated rests entirely within the group. Generally, ROSCA members 
are free to spend their pot without restrictions, so if individuals choose to spend their 
money to grow their businesses, then logically ROSCAS can help create business growth. 
However, this outcome appears to be much less likely than would be the case for a MFI 
that specifically targeted entrepreneurs.  
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Though they have many variants, ROSCAs operate as group savings mechanisms. 
In its most basic form, the group has a set number of members that contributes a set 
quantity of money on a periodic basis. At each meeting, one group member takes home 
the pot. The meetings continue until each member takes home the combined 
contributions. The group may then choose to begin another round or dissolve. 
In comparison to newer informal financial tools, like microfinance, ROSCAs have 
a longstanding global history. There is evidence that this type of alternative finance is 
prevalent in African society and relies on cultural constructs to continue to function 
successfully. In contrast to that of microfinance, research about ROSCAs in Kenya 
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abounds, so it is unnecessary to rely on a specific case study. ROSCAs represent a typical 
case of alternative finance in Kenya. 
It can be difficult for scholars looking into Africa’s past to find historical context. 
Many tribal groups relied on oral tradition, so documentation is often nonexistent. 
Africanists often rely on linguistics for clues about historical practices. The most 
commonly used word for rotating credit in West Africa, esusu, is a term that is generally 
accepted as Yoruba (Nigerian) in origin. It was documented in use among the Egba in 
1843. Shirley Ardener refers to research that shows that at the time contributions were 
made in cowries then eventually in British currency.122 Conversely, the global prevalence 
of ROSCAs, or equivalent institutions, is well documented throughout history. Though it 
seems like a bit of an overstatement given the history of ROSCAs in Africa, Rosemary 
Atieno found that ROSCAs have developed “mostly in response to the lack of access to 
credit by SMEs.”123 Her characterization of the driving force behind ROSCA growth is 
probably more applicable to modern times. 
The development of ROSCAs tends to be associated with the emergence of 
trading activities. According to Fritz Bouman, writing for World Development, credit 
groups allowed traders flexibility for “multiple speculation, bulk purchases, price fixing, 
the allocation of buying and selling territories.”124 In short, it provided them with the 
ability to accomplish a much broader spectrum of financial goals than would be possible 
individually. Imagine that a trader traveled to an isolated town; before modern 
communication, villagers would have no way to know that a trader was en route and to 
begin saving to afford a large good. By pooling money a large purchase becomes 
possible.  
ROSCAs are prevalent globally and have existed for centuries. While it is 
possible, and in some cases likely, that ROSCAs developed after their introduction by 
outside groups, it is not outside the realm of possibility that these groups developed 
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organically. By the end of the 19th century, they were well established in China. An 
urban variant of ROSCAs developed in India at the turn of the century and still exists 
today. One report of rotating credit associations dated as early as 1275 in Japan. Accounts 
place ROSCAs in Southern Africa as early as 1913. Among the earliest African findings 
is a thrift club that was introduced by Nova Scotians to Sierra Leone as early as 1794, 
though the model may not have been fully implemented until 1865. In Scotland, 
historically documented savings clubs were found to have existed in 1825.125 
As evidence of their long history, ROSCAs have developed many variants and 
have been adapted to reflect cultural norms. The order in which group members benefit 
was first decided by status in the community. Customarily, this meant that the village 
elders or the person who initiated the ROSCA were the first beneficiaries.126 As will be 
discussed later, women make up the majority of ROSCA members in Kenya, and there 
are few women chiefs, so they are more likely to adhere to an alternate disbursement 
hierarchy. Another potential method to determine the order is bidding. Though this 
method could be found as early as the 14th century in Japan, it does not have a long 
historical record in Africa.127 Bowman found the first African occurrence of bidding in 
Cameroon in 1972.128  
Through their long history, ROSCAs developed many variants and adapted to 
cultural norms. Some of the ROSCAs Bouman researched have existed for over 
20 years.129 He feels that their continued existence shows they are robust institutions that 
can adapt to changes in economic circumstances, monetary policy, political climate, or 
legislation.130 Because the funds are dispersed at meetings, women can interact in order 
to learn about their societal and economic roles.131 In addition, the meetings provide a 
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social outlet and are frequently accompanied by social events, like village feasts. This 
gives a communal motivation for ROSCA participation that is prioritized over financial 
needs. The persistence of this financial tool means it can be dependable to entrepreneurs. 
C. PREVALENCE OF ROSCAS 
Today, ROSCAs are prevalent globally. Working for World Development, Peter 
Kimuyu found that ROSCAs are more common in developing countries where financial 
markets tend to be fragmented between formal and informal sectors.132  He also 
identified their attractiveness in rural areas because of their low transaction costs, as well 
as some of their marked advantages due to the fact that they experience relatively few 
losses and are more or less self-enforcing.133 
ROSCAs are also widely present in Africa. They go by various names like esusu 
in Anglophone and tontines in Francophone West Africa, stokvel in South Africa, and 
njangi in Cameroon.134 “Merry-go-round” is also another popular pseudonym for 
ROSCAs in Africa. In 1986, 50 percent of the total adult population of the Republic of 
Congo participated, though the report did not address the physical distribution of the 
participants.135 More recently, a 1995 estimate put the participation among the rural 
population of Liberia, Ivory Coast, Togo, and Nigeria between 50 percent and 95 
percent.136 Bouman made a noteworthy observation about the communal nature of 
financial aid in Africa, commenting:  
Africa is particularly noted for its proliferation of mutual aid groups with a 
finance component. Labor groups, church organizations, burial societies, 
professional associations, and age-groups organized around a certain sport, 
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dancing, singing or community development activity, or loyalty to a 
political party: all may involve financial functions.137 
As previously noted, some ROSCA groups endure for decades. In Mary Kay Gugerty’s 
sample of 70 Kenyan ROSCAs, 22, or 31 percent have been in existence for over 10 
years.138 African participation, in particular, is remarkably constant. She found that 
African ROSCA stability is particularly pronounced in southern and eastern Africa.139 
This makes Kenya, located in eastern Africa, particularly interesting to study. 
In Kenya, a 2013 estimate puts the total amount of funds being mobilized outside 
the regulation or control of a monetary authority, or informally, at $19 million.140 From a 
field survey that Siwan Anderson and associates conducted in a poorer area of Kenya, 
57.2 percent of the 374 individuals queried participated in at least one ROSCA.141 This 
roughly correlates with the participation statistics found by Atieno who surveyed 127 
people and found that 51 percent are currently members in ROSCAs (Figure 9). 
Anderson’s team went a bit more in depth and found that, among respondents, the typical 
contribution was 20.3 percent of individual income or 13.6 percent of total family 
income.142 
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Figure 9.  Sample Participation in Informal and Formal Credit143 
 
 
D. ROSCA OPERATIONS 
ROSCA participation is strictly voluntary. In the modern context, Jacqueline 
Copeland-Carson found that some ROSCAs have official positions including chair, 
secretary, treasurer, and auditor.144 Most of the groups she reviewed have formal written 
bylaws, and keep meeting minutes.145 Meetings typically happen in individual homes. In 
its most basic form, the officers collect and distribute funds until everyone has had a turn. 
The overall goal is to provide each member one opportunity to have a lump sum payout 
during the ROSCAs operation. For all but the last recipient, this methodology provides 
quicker access to the payout than individual savings would be able to amass in the same 
amount of time. For the local economy there is also a benefit: as the windfall is spent by 
each member the money is put directly back into circulation instead of being held as 
individual savings. The turnover of money accelerates. Once each member has received a 
payout the ROSCA can dissolve or recommence.  
The contribution amounts vary from group to group. In broad terms, each member 
contributes exactly the same amount at each meeting. Bouman found, in 1995, that 
monthly payouts of ROSCAs in Cameroon varied between 50,000 and 50 million FCFA 
per month per member.146 That converts to between $187 and $187,000 in 1995. It is 
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likely that the individuals who can contribute to the top-tier ROSCAs would have access 
to formal banking, yet they choose to continue to be involved in ROSCAs for other 
reasons. Most ROSCAs are more modest. Akoten, Sawada, and Otsuka determined that 
in Kenya ROSCAs are “the most important source of credit in terms of average loan 
size,” which was 44,960 Ksh or about 500 U.S. dollars.147 In contrast to loans, in 2007, 
Gugerty’s study of 70 women’s ROSCAs that were in operation for an average of seven 
years, discovered that the average pot size was $25, which typically covers about a third 
of monthly expenses in Kenya.148 
The sources of the money that are put into ROSCAs can also vary. Women 
entrepreneurs can invest their own income directly. The minority of Kenyan men who 
participate may likewise invest their earnings. The family may also decide to invest joint 
funds. Gugerty found that 41 percent of Kenyan women received money from their 
husbands for their ROSCA contribution, where the average support from the husband 
equated to $15.149  
The easiest way to differentiate types of ROSCAs is by the way they allocate 
funds. The main methods are fixed, random, and bidding, the last of which is also called 
auction. In a fixed allocation scheme, the order of recipients is set from the beginning. 
Likely, the ROSCA completed a previous round and the member remained in the same 
position. In a random ROSCA, names are chosen through a lottery. The lottery may 
happen at the beginning of each meeting or when the ROSCA is formed. In a bidding 
ROSCA, members auction off the rights to take home the purse.  
There is a commodity variant of ROSCAs. For Kenyan women, this typically 
manifests itself as a group that amasses home goods like kitchen utensils. Through these 
goods-based ROSCAs Kenyan women can acquire a large number household items more 
quickly than would be possible for them individually. For men, the favorites are radios, 
bikes, tools, and construction goods.150 In the commodity model, a second positive 
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externality, beyond getting a large payout, happens. In the bike example, it is possible to 
take advantage of economies of scale and negotiate a group price. Another example that 
Lois Stevenson found was a scheme where members contribute building materials: 
fencing poles, roofing material, or manual labor.151 The donation of goods or skills is an 
interesting variant, because even those in abject poverty who may lack financial liquidity 
can participate and benefit. 
The different variants and adaptations of ROSCAs are a testament to their 
flexibility. The bidding ROSCA seems to present the broadest range of modifications. On 
top of their set contribution, members desiring to take home the pot bid. As the bid goes 
higher, the winner takes home even more money. However, since the person who bids the 
most takes home the lump sum, there is a leveling effect. Since the final two or three 
bidders may be incentivized to outbid each other, to avoid giving another their 
contribution, some groups put a max percentage on bids. To avoid members artificially 
bidding up the pot, some groups take the bids and allocate them to a separate fund. This 
separate fund has a few positive externalities. Some groups choose to divide up this new 
pot at the end of the cycle; others use it to make loans to members. For low income 
ROSCAs, another adaptation is to offer a discount rate instead of a bid. The member who 
takes the pot is the one willing to take the lowest.  
ROSCAs also have informal ways to deal with nonpayment. For fixed allocation 
funds, new members are often placed in the final payout positions. In this way, it ensures 
that they pay for the duration of the ROSCA, and then they can have a more favorable 
position in the next round. Additionally, the organizer or head of the ROSCA may take 
the first payout so that they can cover for other member’s nonpayment.152 Alternately, 
the first payout may be set aside.  
Since the last player is at a disadvantage, several adaptations can level the playing 
field for them. Under certain setups, each winner may be expected to contribute slightly 
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more than the others in future rounds.153 For example, if the monthly buy in is $10, the 
first winner contributes $12 each subsequent month, the second contributes $11, and the 
third $10, etc. In this way, the final winner takes home a larger pot than the first, and puts 
in less money than his or her peers did to do so. A more simplistic option is to reverse the 
payout for the next round. In this setup, the final winner is the first winner the next time, 
and benefits from two large payouts in a row.154  
One criticism of ROSCAs is that members only receive funds once. If an 
emergency arises after their initial distribution, they may have no means to get further 
funds. There are several ways in which the single payout problem can be addressed. In a 
bidding ROSCA, the bids may be divided among the non-winning members at each 
meeting. Additionally, ROSCAs may set aside a portion of the funds to provide loans to 
those facing emergencies. One of the most common ways that people address this 
problem is through simultaneous membership in multiple ROSCAs. Peter Kimuyu 
discovered that of the “45% of the 110 households participated, 65.3% in one scheme 
each, 20% in two schemes, 10% in three schemes, 2% in four schemes and one household 
in a record five schemes.”155 He also  found that, as household size increased, so did a 
family’s number of ROSCA scheme memberships.156 
Bidding ROSCAs often have organizers who receive commissions to do their 
jobs.157 For these associations, a positive net effect is job creation. So, not only can the 
lump sum payouts buy a capital asset that might be required to open a business, like a 
sewing machine, but the act of administrating informal finance creates jobs in the 
informal sector.  
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E. LEGAL STATUS OF ROSCAS 
Despite government support for improving access to financing, there is no formal 
legal construct that codifies ROSCAs in Kenya. In general, ROSCAs operate 
independently from government, financial, and fiscal authorities.158 The lack of 
government involvement may be considered an advantage because it allows for quite a 
bit of flexibility. Groups can be highly adaptable to meet member needs, without the fear 
of government involvement via taxation. One legal variant is that the groups might be 
registered as welfare groups, this characterization seems more likely with ROSCAs that 
are associated with NGOs.159 
There are drawbacks to lacking legal status. Because ROSCAs are informal and 
unregulated finance mechanisms, there is no legal enforcement mechanism that would 
kick in in the event of non-payment. In rural Kenya, it is worthwhile to consider that the 
government may have limited ability to project law enforcement. So, the lack of this 
government enforcement mechanism is a non-issue, and it might be considered the status 
quo. Instead, most ROSCAs rely on social norms as their primary enforcement 
mechanisms. Gugerty noted that they heavily rely on interpersonal connections to 
mitigate the risk of large-scale defaults.160  Even with the lack of legal enforcement, 
typically only 6 percent of participants choose to leave their ROSCA at the end of a 
cycle.161 That statistic is a direct testament to the incredible durability of this informal 
institution.  
F.  CHARACTERIZING ROSCA PARTICIPANTS 
Accessibility of formal finance, income, gender, education level, and social status 
all correlate with an individual’s propensity to participate in a ROSCA. Globally, 
ROSCA participants come from all segments of society. On the whole, because of the 
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requirement for each member to contribute an equal amount on a set schedule, the 
membership of each group tends to be fairly homogenous.  
Access to formal finance is a key determinate of where ROSCAs develop and 
thrive. ROSCAs are commonly found in areas of geographic or social isolation.162 If 
there is no nearby formal construct that allows banking at the frequency level an 
entrepreneur might need, he or she must find another option. Proximity is not the only 
access issue; in developed nations, many individuals are excluded from loans and credit 
because of their poor credit ratings. When people leave nations where ROSCAs are 
ubiquitous, and find themselves in need of credit that they cannot secure through formal 
channels, they have been known to set up ROSCA schemes within their minority group 
in their new locations.163   
Income level also correlates to participation in ROSCA schemes. Because the 
very poor are unlikely to have liquid assets, their participation numbers are lower. 
However, they may participate in ROSCAs that amass tangible goods and services, 
though the relative lack of documentation on this type of ROSCAs seems to indicate that 
these schemes are rare. In his research on addressing self-control problems Stefan Ambec 
and Nicholas Treich found that, in general, ROSCAs tend to attract individuals who have 
average incomes.164 High income individuals are more likely to have access to formal 
finance mechanisms. Even without ready access to banks, the upper strata has more 
liquid assets so the benefit of a ROSCA windfall is diminished.  
Specific occupation does not seem to be a determinate of participation, however, 
steady income does. ROSCAs operate with periodicity, so without a guaranteed stream of 
income, a binding financial commitment is risky. A wider occupational survey of 
ROSCA participants in Africa yields some surprising results. Bouman found that 
75 percent of the employees at the Agricultural Bank of Egypt were ROSCA 
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members.165 In Zimbabwe 76 percent of the urban market traders were members even 
though 77 percent of them reported having bank accounts.166 Gugerty found ROSCA 
members among bank staff in Ghana.167 Even IMF employees participated in 
ROSCAs.168 The use of ROSCAs in Africa among those who have access to formal 
credit indicates that there is some larger rationale than financial need alone can account 
for.  
In Kenya, the numbers may vary from survey to survey, but the vast majority of 
participants are women. This characterization may have more to do with lack of access to 
formal credit than gender affinity for ROSCA membership. In circumstances where a 
woman is the head of household, like widowhood, single motherhood, divorce, or 
separation, participation is also more likely.169 Some groups do allow men, although they 
are the minority. There are a few groups that are men only, interestingly Gugerty found 
that 66 percent of the men who participated in the ROSCAs she surveyed also had wives 
who were participants.170 
Education levels also appear to correlate with ROSCA participation in the several 
studies. Jacqueline Copeland-Carson, noted that “Most, if not all, members of merry-go-
rounds are literate and therefore operate the groups in a modern way.”171 She went on to 
characterize the nature of the groups as one where individuals assume formal 
administrative roles. Gugerty found a positive correlation with participation and years of 
education.172 
Familial or social ties tend to be one of the best determinates of which ROSCA 
group an individual will join in their region. In general, ROSCAs tend to exist where 
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there are strong social ties. Individual ROSCAs are also likely to have a dominant ethnic 
group, and those of that ethnic group will have an easier time becoming members.173 
Societies with “kinship networks, clan membership, and common identification with a 
native place or place of cohabitation” form these requisite strong associations.174 This 
close association can serve a number of purposes. First, it may imbue the group organizer 
with direct knowledge about an individual who would like to participate. Even without 
direct knowledge of an individual, kinship networks and clan membership can give the 
leader an idea about the social norms to which a person is likely to adhere.  
G. PURCHASES WITH ROSCA FUNDS 
ROSCAs provide members with a lump sum to spend at their discretion. While 
some ROSCAs are formed to purchase specific goods, like a bike, other member 
purchases fall into several broad categories. In general, members choose to meet 
immediate needs, buy a high cost durable good, invest in the future, or meet family 
financial obligations. Due to the variable nature of ROSCAs, this list is not exhaustive. 
In difficult times, the pot will first pay for immediate needs. For instance, 
beneficiaries may pay for medical care for themselves or a family member. Even more 
basic, Kimuyu noted that of the 49 households he surveyed, 27 percent purchased 
food.175 These immediate needs do not necessarily exhaust the pot. So, despite 
purchasing consumables, there is often money left over. Purchasing big ticket items is the 
most common reason that people save through ROSCAs. According to Gugerty, 
76 percent of the funds received are spent on a single item.176 Among other uses, funds 
are used to finance agricultural implements and purchase livestock in rural areas.177 
Twenty percent of Kimuyu’s families put their ROSCA lump sums toward school fees.178 
Kenyans have also used ROSCAs to provide income to stabilize their new lives as they 
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move from rural to urban areas.179 This gives them a measure of freedom when they 
would otherwise remain financially dependent on their former village elders. In such 
closely knit societies, the lump sum can also pay for familial obligations. Gugerty found 
that 48 percent of the women she studied gave a portion of the money back to their 
husbands, though she also notes that husbands gave some money to the wives to help 
bankroll their membership.180 For the husband’s part, 22 percent of the men reported 
being in debt to their in-laws over the bride price.181  
There is not much evidence that points to a positive correlation between ROSCA 
membership and entrepreneurship or business growth. However, it is not a large leap to 
surmise that members who benefit from the lump sum payout have the freedom to invest 
in a capital good that will facilitate a business. At the very least, availability of liquid 
assets removes a financial barrier and will not harm entrepreneurs.  
H. WHY SAVE WITH  ROSCAS? 
There are several reasons why informal financial institutions make sense. Kenya’s 
credit market is highly fragmented, it is costly to verify information on banking and loan 
applications. For marginal applicants, this means that they may be denied financing. For 
those in rural areas, formal banks may not be available.  
The bar to membership is lower for ROSCAs than formal banking institutions, 
and the framework is easier to understand. There is likely no requirement for a formal 
application. Without an application, the interested individual does not have to be literate. 
Women are not forced to deal with men, who are the majority of employees at banks. 
There is no fine print. The ROSCA group setting provides a ready source of people that 
are happy to explain the bylaws and expectations of a member. 
When questioned, ROSCA members gave varied reasons for joining their groups 
(Figure 10). Among the 270 respondents, the leading rational for joining was to help 
them save a large sum of money when they were unable to save on their own. The 
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commitment to savings is a key feature of ROSCAs. For people with self-control issues 
who make impulse purchases, the discipline that group savings provides facilitates large 
purchases. 
Figure 10.  Self-Reported Reasons for Joining a ROSCA182 
 
 
Another member-reported problem that a ROSCA can overcome is a situation 
where a family member irresponsibly spends. This is a particularly difficult circumstance 
for a wife who would like to save and a husband who likes to spend. If there is money 
available, it is liable to be spent. However, men and women alike understand and value 
that a commitment made to a group, especially a kinship group, must be kept. In a sense, 
the wife becomes illiquid. Her promise reduces the funds she has available. In this way, 
the wife’s ROSCA membership constrains the behavior of her husband.183 
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ROSCAs can provide certainty combined with a level of flexibility that rarely 
exists in formal banking. Intergenerational ROSCAs can provide a leveling effect. They 
can be designed so those with school-age children get their funds when school fees are 
due.184 ROSCAs can be a proxy for insurance.185 Members can be assured that at a future 
time they will have a large payout. 
I. CULTURAL NORMS PERMEATE AND STABILIZE ROSCAS  
By operating within and being reinforced by existing cultural constructs, 
ROSCAs have been extremely successful in Africa, specifically Kenya. In contrast to the 
newer informal finance tools like microfinance and crowdfunding, as they exist today, 
cultural norms are almost indivisible from ROSCA operations. ROSCAs rely so heavily 
on cultural norms to function, that they tend not to exist in societies without strong social 
ties. In fact, Anderson, Baland, and Moene found that ROSCAs are “never sustainable” 
without a social sanctioning mechanism.186 Adapting microfinance and crowdfunding to 
take advantage of some of the cultural characteristics of ROSCAs will help secure their 
longevity in the financial sector. Entrepreneurs will further benefit from a wide array of 
reliable financing options.  
The homogenous nature of ROSCAs facilitates trust. It is a cyclic relationship. 
ROSCAs cannot exist without trust, and tribal, ethnic, or familial relationships build a 
strong basis for trust. Likewise, those who trust each other tend to form ROSCAs. The 
homogeneity is likely a byproduct of trying to build a group where all members have 
faith in each other. In rural and sparsely populated areas, the association by family or 
tribe may be the only option. However, since each individual has a comparatively larger 
direct knowledge of their neighbors, there is still the option to exclude untrustworthy 
individuals. In urban settings, migrants tend to form ROSCAs along tribal or ethnic 
lines.187 While these individuals may not have direct knowledge of each other, they have 
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an understanding of the upbringing and values of other members. If there is doubt about 
an individual that wishes to join, current ROSCA members can reach back to the 
community to get more information. This process sounds eerily familiar the vetting 
process of references that might accompany a formal loan application, but it happens 
organically. Each member wishes to secure his or her payout, so there is little incentive to 
hide negative information about a prospective member. Alternately, new group members 
may require a backer to vouch for their ability to pay or to underwrite their debt in the 
event of default.188 The leaders of ROSCA groups may simply deny membership to 
individuals they deem untrustworthy. Gugerty found in one urban Kenyan ROSCA that 
disclosing the identity of the participants resulted in a bar to participation.189 According 
to the Legatum index, in 2014, 76.8 percent of Kenyans felt they could depend on family 
and friends in a time of crisis.190  Therefore, ROSCAs typically form among family and 
friends. 
ROSCA default is rare. Generally, ROSCAs are made up of individuals from the 
same socio-economic strata. The reasoning is that if one member was significantly better 
off than the rest, the social pressure for payment would not be enough to ensure his or her 
compliance.191 There is an immense societal pressure to pay debts. Individuals who do 
not have enough available assets to pay regularly, do not choose to join ROSCAs. 
Husbands without steady employment may not allow their wives to join if they cannot be 
certain to have funds to pay. Failure to pay debts can result not only in sanctions on the 
individual, but sanctions on entire families.192 So, if a slightly irresponsible prospective 
member belongs to a trustworthy family entry may be allowed, under the assumption that 
the individual’s family will attempt to repay the debt if necessary. ROSCAs have 
developed into an institution that is so common, that an exclusion for non-payment, 
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would constitute serious social deprivation.193 Contributions to a ROSCA are recognized 
in the community as obligatory, and other community members understand that the debt 
must be paid.194 
Relying on societal norms to work in place of legal enforcement mechanisms is a 
reliable and efficient method to administer ROSCAs. Research indicates that ROSCAs 
debts are set up as debts to members of the community, and microfinance debts are 
typically owed to an NGO or MFI. Understanding the hierarchy of debts in Kenya is also 
important. Debts to community members are more likely to be repaid, which means that 
ROSCAs might have better success over the long term in improving economic welfare 
and business prospects. Another advantage of ROSCAs is that there is no formal cost to 
investigate the creditworthiness of a prospective member.  
Societal norms also dictate that affluent individuals have a duty to help poorer 
ones. ROSCAs facilitate this unwritten social contract. People may actually be ostracized 
for accumulating and not sharing wealth.195 The desire to accumulate tangible goods may 
come from tribal values, but it also reinforces the need to accumulate a large lump sum to 
purchase these assets.196 ROSCAs provide the means to purchase the good and give 
members piece of mind that they will be able to continue to deliver goods to their family 
and friends in the future. The members who use their ROSCA pot for communal 
purposes can expect to receive social prestige from community members.197 
African gender norms play a role determining in ROSCA participation. According 
to Biggart, when it comes to certain areas of responsibility like collective financial 
obligation, women’s gender norms tend to leverage honesty and purity more than would 
be true for men.198 Again, this reinforces their trustworthiness. Susan Johnson found that 
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some women’s groups will actively exclude men.199 Women also tend to handle small 
but frequent flows of money, whereas men are more likely to handle large sums of money 
infrequently.200 Hence, ROSCAs generally work better for the traditional Kenyan 
woman’s spending pattern. Women are much more likely to have the guaranteed 
financial support of their husband after joining a ROSCA. The husband equally values 
the financial obligation and wants to make sure that his wife, directly, and he himself, 
indirectly, is above reproach.201 There would likely be a strong stigma for a husband who 
had agreed to support his wives participation then reneged. When they do participate, 
men’s contributions are higher on average than women’s are, but men’s participation is 
rarer.202 In one study of those living in the town of Karatina in Central Kenya, men 
reported that they did not want to be seen as dependent, which could be viewed as a 
proxy for inferiority.203 Furthermore, they reported apprehension or unwillingness to 
admit publicly they were facing a financial emergency.204 This group of men was also 
found to be less likely to fear the repossession of their personal goods in the event of 
nonpayment.205 So other methods of informal credit may be more societally appropriate 
for them. 
A reliable and efficient method to administer ROSCAs is relying on societal 
norms in place of legal enforcement mechanisms. There is no formal cost to investigate 
the creditworthiness of a prospective member. In addition, the meetings provide a social 
outlet. They are frequently accompanied by social events, like village feasts, and are a 
source of solidarity.206 This gives a communal motivation for ROSCA participation, 
above what financial needs might dictate. 
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J. POSITIVE ROSCA OUTCOMES 
There are many positive results from ROSCAs. Some are more direct than others. 
The nature of the goods that are bought with ROSCA funds is important. A Taiwanese 
study noted a link between ROSCA participation and durables accumulation.207 In a 
study about micro and small business growth, Esther Mbwiria made some exceptional 
discoveries. First, as a result of ROSCA credit intervention, incomes increased ranging 
from 8 percent to 500 percent and averaged an improvement of 115 percent.208 Savings 
went up 82.3 percent, sales climbed 57.7 percent, and 46 percent of businesses hired 
more workers.209 Finally, 11.5 percent of the respondents in her survey reported opening 
new business branches, but none transitioned to the next strata (i.e., micro to small or 
small to medium enterprises).210 This study is significant because it finds that ROSCAs 
have the potential to positively impact business growth.  
ROSCA membership has increased individual economic welfare. According to 
Fritz Bowman, ROSCAs allowed traders flexibility for “multiple speculation, bulk 
purchases, price fixing, the allocation of buying and selling territories.”211 In short, it 
provided members with the ability to accomplish a much broader spectrum of goals than 
would be possible individually. Some groups have mechanisms in place that amend the 
original distribution order when a member experiences a financial crisis. Members of 
MFIs have turned to ROSCAs when they have needed money for AIDS treatment.212 
This preserves their MFI loan and shows that the two informal credit mechanisms can 
work in concert to pay business and emergency bills. In this way, the increased economic 
welfare that ROSCA membership brings can help pay unforeseen medical bills.  
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The sense of community that ROSCAs enforce is also important. Through their 
regular meetings, group members can keep tabs on each other. They have the flexibility 
to temporarily change the rules and give a payout in times of emergency. Members have 
been known to swap turns in rotation to better suit individual needs.  
K. NGO INVOLVEMENT IN ROSCAS 
The research about NGO involvement in ROSCAs was slim but provided some 
worthwhile ideas. For ROSCA groups that lack liquid funds, NGOs can borrow from 
banks, and turn around and lend the money to the ROSCA. The ROSCA then loans out 
the fund at a slightly higher interest rate, and the group gets to keep the interest 
differential. It is a win for the ROSCA because it accumulates funds. It is also a win for 
the NGO because it does not have to shoulder the administrative burden of a loan, and the 
risk of total default is lessened because the money is spread over multiple group 
members.213 
NGO lending has some drawbacks. They do not have the same level of 
knowledge of ROSCA groups or individuals as indigenous community members.214 Even 
if the NGO hires a person from the community to help with fund allocation, there is a 
perception in Africa that it is more acceptable to refuse to pay a government debt than a 
clan or familial one. There is also very little research that shows this type of lending is 
effective. Even if it was proven highly effective, NGOs are more accustomed to handling 
welfare and humanitarian aid, they may lack the resources to administer more 
complicated financial programs.215 Currently, results are mixed. Though pessimistic, 
Bouman observed that “After 40 years of development aid, we must finally accept that 
indigenous self-help societies have their own ways of helping themselves and their own 
ideas of what Utopia looks like and at what tempo to get there.”216 If building enterprises 
is the goal, Bouman would contend that development must not be forced upon Kenyans. 
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Instead, it must emerge in a way that Africans can embrace, which means it should reflect 
their social ideals.  
L. CRITICISMS OF ROSCAS 
Criticisms of ROSCAs include the unpredictability of payout, a high 
administrative burden for the group leader, the inability to accommodate multiple 
emergencies at one time, lack of interest on deposits, and single payout. Furthermore, as 
businesses grow, ROSCAs are unlikely to grow to meet an individual’s mounting 
needs.217 These budding businesses may not yet possess enough collateral assets to 
secure a formal loan. This creates a segment of businesses that can remain open and 
functional, yet does not grow. This might explain why women own so few medium size 
enterprises in Kenya. Perceptions also create problems for women entrepreneurs. Because 
ROSCAs are used so widely among women in Kenya, entrepreneurs reported a general 
errant view that their credit options were favorable.218 Groups can also be discriminatory. 
ROSCAs are also generally out of reach for those without reliable income. Even with 
their emergence and rapid growth, microfinance institutions often have stringent 
borrowing conditions, which limits their utility.219 Akoten, Sawada, and Otsuka also note 
that, as of 2006, MFIs terms are becoming increasingly strict.220 This is a troubling trend. 
ROSCAs do not typically earmark their funds, and their members are free to use 
their funds as they see fit. Given that reality, an NGO that’s expressed goal is business 
development may not find that ROSCAs are an efficient way to invest because only a 
portion, if any, of their money will develop businesses. Additionally, the money does not 
have strings attached. Short of providing a forum for discussion and information sharing, 
ROSCAs do not provide training to entrepreneurs. There is likewise no requirement that 
members take classes about financial responsibility or business development.  
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Several criticisms of ROSCAs can be addressed by modifying their operational 
rules to tackle predictability of payout, high administrative cost for the group leader, 
multiple personal emergencies at a time, no interest, and only one payout. Established 
groups may resist change. Many studies found that individuals belong to multiple 
ROSCA groups; if they found their current group could not meet their needs, they could 
leave at the end of the cycle.  
M. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
ROSCAs have a longstanding history. Their formation and operation is flexible 
and adapts to the needs of members. The informal credit market, which is dominated by 
ROSCAs in Kenya, can enable entrepreneurs to open micro or small enterprises. When 
comparing microfinance and ROSCAs, ROSCAs provide the most culturally relevant 
model. However, ROSCAs do not stipulate that funds must be spent on businesses, nor 
do they provide training for entrepreneurs, so their contribution to MSE or SME 
development is likely coincidental. Though the research on the direct linkage between 
business growth and ROSCAs is sparse, the capability to purchase a large capital good 
would enable Kenyan entrepreneurs to buy items that they need to support their 
operations. It seems reasonable that ROSCAs could facilitate business growth; however, 
they are more likely to be associated with other positive welfare outcomes. The most 
important take away from ROSCAs is that adapting an informal finance option to the 
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IV. COMBINED ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. IMPORTANCE OF BUSINESS GROWTH VERSUS INCREASED 
INDIVIDUAL WELFARE 
Both business growth and increased individual welfare resulting from alternative 
finance options are important outcomes. Business growth helps the national economy. It 
provides jobs and grows the GDP. Improved personal welfare reduces the negative 
effects of poverty. Kenyans with increased financial means can afford to send their 
children to school and pay for medication in times of need. They have a buffer in times of 
economic hardship, as are common during Kenyan droughts. Though an alternative 
finance method that could create both is preferable, the ability to improve financial 
circumstances in either respect would merit a policy of continued support to either 
microfinance or ROSCAs.  
B. COMPARING MICROFINANCE VERSUS ROSCAS IN TERMS OF 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Business growth is an important finding, whether it results from microfinance 
loans and savings or ROSCA membership. Growth means that employers might be able 
to hire more employees, earn higher profits, and increase their output. Perhaps, most 
significantly, enduring business growth means a higher GDP for Kenya.  
Though historical research findings on the ability of microfinance to create 
meaningful economic growth are mixed, recent studies are more optimistic. In a 2016 
report from Bangladesh, often cited as the birthplace of microfinance, Yousuf Sultan and 
Mansur Masih empirically tested microfinance’s ability to cause domestic economic 
growth. Their two key findings were that “(i) There is significant impact of microfinance 
on domestic growth (GDP). (ii) Growth also has strong relationship with 
microfinance.”221 In a 2011 study in the Journal of Development Economics Christian, 
Ahlin, Lin, and Maio found that the country context is an important determinate in the 
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success of MFIs.222 Therefore, poor performance may result directly from poor policies 
and the failure of MFIs does not prove that MFIs are to blame.223 In light of this finding, 
supportive national policies will generally result in greater levels of MFI success within a 
nation. 
Certain MFIs within Kenya have successfully created economic growth. 
Specifically, the KWFT MFI presents a convincing case for the continued support of 
MFIs within Kenya. Ouma’s study of 190 women entrepreneurs financed by the KWFT 
in Kisumu, Kenya yielded several important growth findings. Of the SMEs, 85 percent 
were likely to experience higher growth after receiving the loans. There was generally an 
increase in the number of workers in the SMEs, which means that these loans created 
jobs. Ouma and Rambo also reported that 85.8 percent of the respondents indicated that 
their liabilities were decreasing.224 After borrowing from the KWFT, 87.4 percent 
experienced higher profits,225 and 80 percent of SMEs that received loans from the 
KWFT also experienced increased sales.226 Though tying Kenya’s recent GDP growth to 
the success of the KWFT would be a step too far, national policies and legislation that 
support MFI in general could help explain a portion of the GDP rise. However, proving 
the causal link between supportive national MFI policy and GDP growth is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
The case for ROSCAs creating economic growth is weaker than that of MFIs. 
Individual choice plays a large role, and members that do not choose to use their funds to 
benefit their businesses will not create economic growth as a result of ROSCA 
membership. However, the case for ROSCAs is not lost. In 2013, about 25 percent of the 
Kenyan population, or 5.6 million people, reported that they were members of savings 
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groups.227 Conversely, the Central Bank of Kenya only registers 13 licensed 
Microfinance banks in its books.228 Unfortunately, statistics on the total number of 
Kenyan citizens served by microfinance institutions were not available during the course 
of this study. If only 1 percent of those that are ROSCA members use their pot toward 
business goals, this still means that 56,000 citizens have been empowered to create 
economic growth. Whereas within Kenya, MFIs can create definitive growth, it is 
reasonable to conclude that ROSCA membership will contribute to economic growth.  
For MFIs wishing to increase their success rates, examining the cultural reasons 
for the prevalence and success of ROSCAs within Kenya can provide clues as to how to 
structure MFIs for success. The non-payment rate is much lower within ROSCA groups 
than the default rate on loans is for MFIs. This is attributed in large part to the fact that 
ROSCAs are generally composed of groups of individuals that know each other. 
Culturally, the pressure to pay back known individuals is much higher within the Kenyan 
culture than the pressure to pay back and NGO or government-backed loans. The 
individual who leads the ROSCA generally does so on a volunteer basis, so there is little 
administrative cost associated with ROSCAs. By comparison, MFIs must charge interest 
to cover their overhead. With this reality in mind, the KWFT employs lending practices 
that leverages ROSCAs practices. One of their schemes lends to groups instead of 
individuals. By lending to a group, the loan amount can be much higher, and the loan to 
many individuals is managed as one which reduces relative administrative costs. The 
group is responsible to the trust and exerts pressure on individual members when it comes 
time to repay the loan. This reduces the required interest rate, the default rate, and the 
burden to attempt to check the credit worthiness of each individual.  
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C. COMPARING MICROFINANCE VERSUS ROSCAS IN TERMS OF 
INCREASING INDIVIDUAL WELFARE 
Both microfinance borrowers and ROSCA members have demonstrated their 
penchant to use their funds to increase their individual welfare. In the case of MFIs that 
target entrepreneurs, this diversion of funds might be seen as a negative, but it would be 
short sided to judge borrowers in this manner. In fact, many MFIs in Kenya have less 
specific goals than the KWFT and do not dictate how the loan money should or will be 
spent. When an individual business owner is worried about a sick child or whether they 
will have enough food to feed their family, their general business productivity suffers. 
Even if a portion of their loan is diverted to personal needs, the remainder can be spent on 
the business. Small diversions of loans must be expected and allowed for in times of 
crisis. Once the immediate need is met and the borrower is surer of their continued 
personal welfare, he or she will be in a better position to create business growth. This is 
not to say that MFI loans should be used as the singular means of support for individual 
welfare. After all, loans are ideally repaid. If individuals are allowed to borrow beyond 
the ability they have to repay, this will create an additional source of stress. Likewise, if 
MFI loans are not repaid, the institutions will run dry of funding and be unable to serve 
the community in any capacity.    
Using a ROSCA or MFI loan to increase individual welfare is a fundamental 
good. Using the funds toward healthcare may ensure that a family member survives and 
illness. This person will be around to work in the future and their earnings, no matter how 
meager, will contribute to GDP growth. Money that is used to pay for school fees will 
result in a more educated work force. Since higher education is directly linked to higher 
skilled jobs with greater incomes, this use will also support an increasing GDP.  
D. OTHER EXISTING ALTERNATIVE FINANCE OPTIONS 
There are several less common informal finance mechanisms apart from ROSCAs 
including Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations (ASCRAs) and Savings and 
Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOs). Several banks have also developed programs 
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that rely on communal institutions. One of the final and most obvious options for those 
looking to informal finance is to borrow from family or friends.  
ASCRA are formed by individuals who contribute to a central pot and are then 
allowed to take loans from the pot.229 A benefit of an ASCRA is that loans are repaid 
with interest. Groups may choose to divide the interest or allow the pot to grow for future 
loans. In the divided interest scenario, member inputs behave like capital investments that 
have periodic returns. This informal finance group looks a lot like a ROSCA. The groups 
are typically homogenous: same ethnic group, socioeconomic status, and gender. They 
rely on informal social connections for loan repayment guarantees. They are valuable 
tools, because individuals must merely convince the other members they are trustworthy. 
ASCRAs can operate within ROSCA groups or as their own entities.  
SACCOs are most commonly organized as crop-based or workplace savings 
mechanisms. Instead of payouts or loans, this type of group focuses on savings.230 From 
their member’s savings they accumulate capital and can give credit to entrepreneurs. 
Unlike ROSCAs, which lack legal standing, SACCOs were formalized under the 
Cooperative Societies Act of 1998.231 Because they are codified to require monthly 
payments by members, they are inherently less flexible than ROSCAs.  
Barclays Bank has established loans specifically geared toward groups of women 
entrepreneurs. It offers credit to small and large entrepreneurs who work outside the farm 
sector. Typical loan interest rates remain in force and they do not accept new clients who 
specifically want to take advantage of these loans. Only existing members may benefit. 
The client must provide collateral to cover 25 percent of the loan. While this is another 
potential option, it is limited to those bank members who already have collateral. This 
rules out a very large percentage of Kenyans.232  
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E. THE EMERGENCE OF NEW FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES 
With the emergence of M-PESA, Kenya has led the way in mobile banking. In 
2014, 60.6 percent of Kenyans utilized mobile money subscriptions.233 According to the 
Brookings Institute’s 2016 report on financial inclusion, Kenya is considered “the most 
mature mobile money market in the world, driven by the widespread success of 
Safaricom’s M-PESA service.”234 This is a significant development because M-PESA 
currently serves many more Kenyans than MFIs or ROSCAs do. Mobile banking has also 
been associated with positive growth and individual welfare findings. The Economist 
reported that “in rural Kenyan households that adopted M-PESA, incomes increased by 
5–30 percent.”235 However, there does not seem to be much research on whether or not 
this reduces Kenyan proclivity to borrow thorough ROSCA groups or MFIs. When it 
comes to ROSCAs, their continued existence, even in areas that are well served by formal 
banks, seems to indicate that they will remain in place in the future. Perhaps ROSCAs 
will begin to use electronic funds transfers during their meetings in the future, but the 
change in payment method is not likely to alter their group meeting format. However, the 
sustainability of MFI in this emerging mobile banking environment is more nuanced. If 
MFIs leverage mobile technology to reduce their transaction costs, they will stand a 
better chance of survival. Conversely, if MFIs can only offer more expensive loans than 
other finance options or are unavailable when needed, they will likely lose market share 
and risk falling out of favor.  
F. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are several topics that would be useful to study in the future. It would have 
been preferable to focus on a broader range of MFIs that target entrepreneurs instead of a 
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single case study on the KWFT; however, there are no comprehensive studies currently in 
the literature. Likewise, exact figures on how many Kenyans employ ROSCAs or 
microfinance would have been helpful. Unfortunately, this number might also be 
impossible to find. Based on the emergence of financial technologies, it is possible that a 
fundamental shift is happening in how Kenyans borrow, but the possible trend is too new 
to have been thoroughly analyzed. Future research on how M-PESA is drawing Kenyans 
away from formal or informal finance would provide helpful trends for analysis. 
More studies of the effects of NGO-run MFIs are needed. In a sense, NGO-run 
MFIs are foreign aid programs, and one of the biggest criticisms of foreign aid is that it 
can keep local governments weak and undermine development. Specifically, Van De 
Wall found that foreign aid programs will cause government programs to be 
underutilized. Since this type of aid is managed externally, it may not be integrated with 
or facilitate larger developmental goals. Critics of aid might point out that, the gains from 
implementing microfinance might undermine the gains a national government could 
achieve by broadly investing in its economy. The gains from implementing microfinance 
might be dwarfed by or undermine the potential gains a national government could 
achieve by broadly investing in its economy. However, convincing African leaders to 
subscribe to the developmental state model may be impossible. Conversely, convincing a 
dictator to allow an NGO that administers microfinance entry into his markets might be 
more feasible, but NGOs must be wary when they operate in these circumstances so that 
they do not unwittingly become instruments of the authoritarian regime.236 
G. SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS 
Ensuring entrepreneurs’ success is key to the development and economic future of 
Africa. In Kenya, the formal credit market does not extend easily to rural areas, and is 
unlikely to serve the poorest clients. Without access to financing entrepreneurs will be 
unable to start or grow their businesses. Women face an especially hard time securing 
formal credit. Without access to resources, businesses will continue to be stunted or 
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collapse. While MFIs that target entrepreneurs have generated better economic growth 
findings, ROSCAs are better structured to broadly increase individual economic welfare.  
Specifically, the KWFT shows that investing in entrepreneurs can have broad 
positive effects in terms of economic growth and increased economic welfare. The Trust 
succeeded in a nation that is rated as unfavorable to business, but that has passed 
legislation favorable to microfinance. By seeking out entrepreneurs and training them, the 
KWFT overcame many obstacles and should be a model for future MFIs. It is an example 
of success in a region that leaves much to be desired in the areas of business growth and 
economic prosperity. To help ensure continued success in the future, MFIs should 
leverage the successes of ROSCAs. The KWFT already does so in is group lending 
scheme, which is perhaps another explanation for its longevity. As new financial 
technologies emerge, MFIs should adapt and employ their best practices to lower 
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